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RULE 37 SANCTIONS: DETERRENTS TO
DISCOVERY ABUSES
Kathy Bidegaray Irigoin
I. INTRODUCTION
On January 1, 1962, the Montana Legislature enacted a sys-
tem of procedure, patterned after the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure, to govern the preparation and conduct1 of civil suits tried
and settled at the district court level.2 The Legislature imple-
mented these new rules to allow Montana courts jurisdiction over
parties having substantial contacts with the State of Montana3 and
to facilitate a "just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of
every action."4 Although the Legislature initially adopted this new
system, the Montana Supreme Court has applied, interpreted, and
amended 5 the rules since 1962.
Rule 37 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure enumerates
the sanctions' that a court may impose on parties who fail to com-
ply with court orders directing discovery.7 This comment examines
the purpose and effect of Rule 37 sanctions in relation to the dis-
covery process. It outlines the evolution of these sanctions as evi-
denced by Montana case law.
II. RULE 26 DISCOVERY-AN OVERVIEW
Proper discovery is crucial to the competent disposition of
every case because it enables each party's attorney to identify the
strengths and weaknesses of his client's case, thereby promoting a
1. The Rules govern all suits of a civil nature except special statutory proceedings
excluded by Rule 81.
2. MONT. R. Civ. P. 1.
3. MONT. R. Civ. P. 4B.
4. MONT. R. Civ. P. 1.
5. MONT. R. Civ. P. 86(a) provides a framework for the Montana Supreme Court to
amend the Rules of Civil Procedure.
6. See generally Rosenberg, Sanctions to Effectuate Pretrial Discovery, 58 COLO. L.
REV. 480 (1958) (discussing the sanctions and the linguistic difficulties of Rule 37).
7. MONT. R. Civ. P. 26 contains the general provisions governing discovery. With the
adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and particularly of Rule 26, Montana
acquired "a comprehensive system for obtaining and requiring disclosure of information
needed to prepare for and to prevent surprise at trial." Mason, The Montana Rules of Civil
Procedure, 23 MONT. L. REV. 3, 46 (1961). To facilitate discovery, Rule 26(a) provides for (1)
depositions upon oral examination or written questions, (2) written interrogatories, (3) pro-
duction of documents or things or permission to enter upon land or other property, for
inspection and other purposes, (4) physical and mental examination, and (5) requests for
admission.
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reliable evaluation of settlement possibilities.' Even where trial is
not avoidable, an attorney can effectively present a client's case
only after conducting thorough discovery.' Furthermore, pretrial
discovery promotes fairness and prevents surprise at trial.10 Ac-
cordingly, the Montana Rules of Civil Procedure governing discov-
ery encourage (1) disclosure of evidence by each side to achieve
trial results based on the merits of a dispute, (2) realistic evalua-
tion of settlement possibilities, and (3) avoidance of unequal ad-
vantages to either party."
The scope of discovery, under Rule 26, extends to "any mat-
ter, not privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter involved
in the pending action."" Under Rule 26, the existence and con-
tents of insurance agreements are discoverable although this infor-
mation cannot be introduced as evidence." Materials prepared for
trial cannot be discovered under the rule, however, unless the dis-
covering party establishes a "substantial need" and an inability to
obtain the material "without undue hardship."" Information gen-
erally comes within the scope of discovery if it is "reasonably cal-
culated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence."' 5
Occasionally, attorneys fail to furnish requested information
that is legitimately discoverable. In delaying discovery, attorneys
often expect either to frustrate the opposition or to acquire addi-
tional time to prepare a client's case. Attorneys employing dilatory
discovery tactics face the possibility that the court will impose one
or more of the sanctions found in Rule 37.
III. RULE 37 SANCTIONS
A. The Purposes of Rule 37 Sanctions
Because the rules governing discovery'" are not self-execut-
8. See FED. R. Civ. P. 37 advisory committee note (1970), reprinted in 4A J. MOORE,
MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 37.01[8] (2d ed. 1984). See also Massaro v. Dunham, -
Mont...., 603 P.2d 249, 252 (1979) (citing Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 507 (1947)).
9. C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL COURTS § 81 (2d ed. 1970). See also supra note 7 for an enu-
meration of the allowed methods of discovery.
10. Wolfe v. Northern Pac. Ry. Co., 147 Mont. 29, 40, 409 P.2d 528, 534 (1966) (citing
Coca Cola Co. v. Dixi-Cola Laboratories, Inc., 30 F. Supp. 275 (D. Md. 1939)).
11. See FED. R. Civ. P. 37 advisory committee note (1970), reprinted in 4A MOORE
supra note 8, I 37.01 (2d ed. 1984).
12. MONT. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).
13. MONT. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2).
14. MONT. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3).
15. MONT. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).
16. See generally MONT. R. Civ. P. 26-36.
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ing,17 the Legislature implemented the sanctions of Rule 37 to en-
force the methods of discovery enumerated in Rule 26(a).' 8 Shortly
after Rule 37 was adopted, however, its sanctions were rarely im-
posed. Judges were reluctant to dismiss actions' 9 or to render de-
fault judgments2 ° because the primary purpose of discovery was to
provide a means by which each side could realistically evaluate its
case and effectuate a disposition of the case on its merits.2 When a
court dismissed a case or rendered a default judgment, the case
was not tried on its merits. Judges hesitated to punish recalcitrant
parties unless their noncompliance could not be justified.2" Faced
with no real threat of punishment, parties across the nation abused
the rules of discovery, rendering the discovery processes virtually
useless. 3
The trend of allowing discovery abuses was reversed by the
United States Supreme Court in National Hockey League v. Met-
ropolitan Hockey Clubs, Inc.24 In National Hockey League, re-
spondents failed to timely answer written interrogatories25 even af-
ter the district court admonished them for their conduct, granted
them numerous extensions, and ordered them to answer interroga-
tories. The Court affirmed the district court's dismissal of respon-
dents' antitrust action for two reasons. The Court noted first that
17. Owen v. F.A. Buttrey Co., - Mont. ., 627 P.2d 1233, 1235 (1981) (citing
SCM Societa Commerciale S.P.A. v. Industrial and Commercial Research Corp., 72 F.R.D.
110, 112 (N.D. Tex. 1976)).
18. Jaap v. District Court, - Mont. -, 623 P.2d 1389, 1391 (1981). For a brief
discussion of MONT. R. Civ. P. 26(a) and an enumeration of the allowed methods of discov-
ery, see supra note 7.
19. MONT. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(C) allows dismissal of an action as a sanction.
20. MONT. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(C) authorizes courts to enter default judgments for fail-
ure to discover.
21. Owen, - Mont. at __, 627 P.2d at 1235 (citing W. GLASER, PRETRIAL Discov-
ERY AND THE ADVERSARY SYSTEM 154-56 (1968)). See also Wolfe v. Northern Pac. Ry. Co.,
147 Mont. 29, 40, 409 P.2d 528, 534 (1966).
22. Id.
23. Note, Discovery Sanctions Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: A Goal-
Oriented Mission for Rule 37, 29 CASE W. RES. 603, 622 (1979).
24. 427 U.S. 639 (1976).
25. MONT. R. Civ. P. 33(a) provides that the party, served with interrogatories, must:
serve a copy of the answers, and objections if any, within 30 days after the service
of the interrogatories, except that a defendant may serve answers or objections
within 45 days after service of the summons and complaint upon that defendant.
The court may allow a shorter or longer time. The party submitting the interroga-
tories may move for an order under Rule 37(a) with respect to any objection to or
other failure to answer an interrogatory.
(Emphasis added).
26. Pursuant to MONT. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(C), dismissal of the case is a suitable punish-
ment for failure to respond to written interrogatories.
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the sanctions of Rule 3727 must be available to courts to penalize
parties exhibiting "flagrant bad faith" and "callous disregard" of
their responsibilities, and second, that the sanctions of Rule 37
must be available "to deter those who might be tempted to such
conduct in the absence of such a deterrent."2"
The Montana Supreme Court, in Owen v. F.A. Buttrey Co.,29
unequivocally adopted the purposes and functions of Rule 37 sanc-
tions as stated in National Hockey League.3 0 In Owen, defendants
refused to answer interrogatories, so the district court precluded
defendants from introducing evidence contrary to the admitted
facts, awarded attorney fees, and ordered parts of defendants' an-
swer stricken. In affirming the sanctions imposed, the Montana Su-
preme Court stated that National Hockey League was "a pivotal
case in the development of Rule 37 as a punitive and deterrent
mechanism.""1 The court noted further that under the National
Hockey League decision deterrence is not merely permissible but
perhaps a mandatory objective of Rule 37.32 The sanctions of Rule
37 must be used to deter discovery abuses and provide for the
"just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action. '3 3 Fi-
nally, the Montana Supreme Court warned that parties resorting
to "willful delay, evasive responses, and disregard of court direc-
tion as part . . . of their trial strategy" would suffer the conse-
quences of Rule 37 sanctions.3
B. District Court Authority Under Rule 37
Rule 37 addresses both the consequences of a litigant's failure
to make discovery, and grants district courts authority to issue any
order which is "just."3 5 Given such broad authority, a district
27. The decision in National Hockey League was based on Rule 37(b), but the court's
statement as to the purpose of Rule 37(b) sanctions is equally applicable to all the sanctions
of Rule 37.
28. National Hockey League, 427 U.S. at 643. See also Stanton v. Iver Johnson's
Arms, Inc., 88 F.R.D. 290, 291 (1980) (here, the court, citing National Hockey League, or-
dered that certain facts supporting the discovering party's claim be taken as established and
that the disobedient party pay reasonable attorney fees incurred by the discovering party in
pursuing the claim).
29. - Mont. -, 627 P.2d 1233.
30. See id. at -, 627 P.2d at 1236.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id. (citing FED. R. Civ. P. 1 and MONT. R. Civ. P. 1). See also supra note 17 and
accompanying text.
34. Owen, - Mont. at - , 627 P.2d at 1236.
35. MONT. R. Civ. P. 37(d) provides in relevant part:
If a party or an officer, director, or managing agent of a party or a person desig-
nated under Rule 30(b)(6) or 31(a) to testify on behalf of a party fails (1) to ap-
[Vol. 46
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court, in its discretion, may determine whether imposition of sanc-
tions is just and which sanctions it should impose." For example,
the court in Owen prohibited defendants from introducing evi-
dence contrary to admitted facts, awarded attorney fees, and or-
dered parts of defendants' answer stricken,3 7 while the court in
National Hockey League dismissed the recalcitrant parties' ac-
tion.3 8 The authority of district courts to make these determina-
tions is so well established that reviewing courts rarely reverse
lower court decisions concerning the imposition of sanctions. 9 Ac-
cordingly, the Montana Supreme Court stated in Owen, "when it is
not possible for this Court to make a ready, confident, and accu-
rate determination of a party's good faith in the discovery process,
we presume the correctness of the District Court's action under
Rule 37.40
C. The Four Categories of Rule 37 Sanctions
Rule 37 provides four types4 ' of sanctions which courts may
impose on recalcitrant parties. These sanctions include: (1) court
pear before the officer who is to take his deposition, after being served with a
proper notice, or (2) to serve answers or objections to interrogatories submitted
under Rule 33, after proper service of the interrogatories, or (3) to serve a written
response to a request for inspection submitted under Rule 34, after proper service
of the request, the court in which the action is pending on motion may make such
orders in regard to the failure as are just, and among others it may take any action
authorized under paragraphs (A), (B), and (C) of subdivision (b)(2) of this rule.
(Emphasis added). See Societe Internationale v. Rogers, 357 U.S. 197, 212 (1958) (a com-
plaint should not be dismissed for a party's noncompliance with a pretrial production order
when the failure to comply is "due to inability, and not to a willfulness, bad faith, or any
fault" of the party).
36. "Rule 37(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure empowers district courts with
broad discretion to impose sanctions upon recalcitrant parties." Stanton v. Iver Johnson's
Arms, Inc., 88 F.R.D. 290, 291 (D.C. Mont. 1980) (emphasis added). See, e.g., Vehrs v. Pi-
quette, - Mont. - , 648 P.2d 476, 480 (1984) (holding that the district court was "act-
ing well within the confines of its discretion" when it imposed the sanction of limiting the
recalcitrant party's proof, on certain counts, to the evidence contained in discovery docu-
ments); Owen, - Mont. __, 627 P.2d 1233, 1237 (holding that the orders of the district
court, awarding attorney fees to the discovering party and striking parts of the resisting
party's answer, were "wholly within its discretionary power"); and Calaway v. Jones, -
Mont. -, 624 P.2d 991, 992 (1981) (holding that the district court would have been
"within the permissible range of discretion in imposing sanctions of default and dismissal"
for the disobedient party's failure to attend the pretrial conference if the party had been
given notice of the conference and his required attendance).
37. Owen, -_ Mont. at - , 627 P.2d at 1234.
38. National Hockey League, 427 U.S. at 639.
39. Owen, __ Mont. at __, 627 P.2d at 1237 (citing National Hockey League, 427
U.S. 639 (1976); Lumby v. Doetch, - Mont. -, 600 P.2d 200, 202 (1979)).
40. Id.
41. See R. MCCULLOUGH II & J. UNDERWOOD, CIVIL TRIAL MANUAL 2, 306-10 (1974)
[hereinafter cited as MCCULLOUGH & UNDERWOOD].
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orders issued at the request of the discovering party compelling
the disobedient party or deponent to perform the requested dis-
covery activities, 42 (2) penalties for failure to comply with a court
order,43 (3) contempt citations usually issued for the violation of
court orders,4 and (4) monetary sanctions.4" A detailed discussion
of each type of sanction follows.
1. Court Orders Compelling Discovery-Rules 37(a) and 37(d)
a. Rule 37(a)
Upon application to the appropriate court, 46 a party con-
ducting discovery may move47 for an order compelling discovery
against an opposing party who, with or without stated objections,"
42. Under MONT. R. Civ. P. 37(a), the discovering party may request an order to com-
pel discovery. MONT. R. Civ. P. 37(d) provides that the court in which an action is pending
may, upon motion, issue certain motions. For the text of Rule 37(d), see supra note 35. The
three situations where Rule 37(d) orders apply are listed in the text accompanying infra
notes 73-75.
43. MONT. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2) provides sanctions that can be imposed for the violation
of an order to compel discovery issued pursuant to Rule 37(a). Further, MONT. R. Civ. P.
37(d) provides sanctions that can be imposed where the party from whom discovery is
sought displays a total lack of response.
44. Pursuant to MONT. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(1), the court in which a deposition is taken may
hold any deponent who fails to be sworn or to answer a question after being directed to do
so by that court in contempt. In addition, under MONT. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(D), the court in
which the action is pending may treat as contempt of court a party's failure to obey any
orders except an order to submit to a physical or mental examination per MONT. R. Civ. P.
35. For a discussion of Rule 35, see infra note 90.
45. MONT. R. Civ. P. 37 provides for four categories of monetary sanctions. See infra
notes 142-71 and accompanying text for a discussion of the monetary sanctions available
under Rule 37.
46. MONT. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(1) defines the appropriate court for such an application as
"the court in which the action is pending, or, on matters relating to a deposition, . . . the
court in the district where the deposition is being taken." The rule requires deponents who
are not parties to apply for such an order in "the district where the deposition is being
taken."
47. MONT. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(2) governs when and under what circumstances a party may
move for an order compelling discovery. For a thorough discussion of these circumstances,
see infra text accompanying notes 49-70. MONT. R. Civ. P. 33(a) and 34(b) provide that the
party initiating discovery may move for an order under Rule 37(a) when faced with any
objection to or failure to discover. MONT. R. Civ. P. 37(d) authorizes the court in which the
action is pending, on motion per Rule 37(a), to make such orders as are just, see supra note
35, including the orders described in MONT. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(A), 37 (b)(2)(B), and
37(b)(2)(C).
48. MONT. R. Civ. P. 33(a) requires that the party responding to the interrogatories
either answer "separately and fully in writing under oath" or object to the interrogatory and
state reasons for the objection. MONT. R. Civ. P. 34(b) similarly requires that the responding
party either state, in writing, "with respect to each item or category, that inspection and
related activities will be permitted as requested" or object to the request and include rea-
sons for the objection.
6
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resists discovery. 49 Rule 37(a)(2) describes three situations where a
party may move for an order compelling discovery. First, a discov-
ering party may move for an order compelling discovery where a
deponent fails to answer 10 a question submitted pursuant to depo-
sitions upon either oral examination51 or written questions.52  Or-
ders compelling deponents to answer questions are effective
against both individuals and corporations.5"
Secondly, a party may move for an order compelling discovery
if a party fails to answer 54 an interrogatory, as required in Rule
33.55 Under Rule 33(a), a party served with interrogatories may ei-
ther answer them in writing or object to them.5 Rule 33(a) sug-
gests that a discovering party may move for orders to compel in
the event that the party served with interrogatories either objects
to an interrogatory or fails to answer one. Some commentators,57
however, maintain that the orders of Rule 37(a) may be sought
only where there has been a response, such as a formal objection,
that does not satisfy the needs or expectations of the discovering
party.
In the event of a formal objection, the commentators contend
that the proper solution for the discovering party is to move for an
order under Rule 37(a) compelling that the interrogatory be an-
swered.5 8 If the party against whom discovery is sought neither an-
swers an interrogatory nor objects to it, the commentators recom-
mend that the discovering party move the court to impose
49. See generally J. MOORE, K. HARPER & L. FOLKMAN, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE
RULES PAMPHLET § 37.4 (1984) [hereinafter cited as MOORE'S PAMPHLET].
50. "[A]n evasive or incomplete answer is treated as a failure to answer." MONT. R.
Civ. P. 37(a)(3). See also Massaro v. Dunham, - Mont. -, 603 P.2d 249, 252 (1979).
51. MONT. R. Civ. P. 30 governs depositions upon oral examination.
52. MONT. R. Civ. P. 31 governs depositions upon written questions.
53. Under MONT. R. Civ. P. 30(b)(6), which governs oral depositions, any organization,
whether a public or private corporation, a partnership, an association or governmental
agency, named as the deponent, must designate one or more officers, directors, managing
agents, or persons who consent to testify in its behalf and describe the matters on which
each person shall testify. If the organization fails to make a designation according to Rule
30(b)(6), the discovering party may move for an order compelling discovery under Rule
37(a). MONT. R. Civ. P. 31(a) governs written depositions and requires organizations named
as deponents to make designations "in accordance with the provisions of Rule 30(b)(6)."
54. See supra note 50.
55. MONT. R. Civ. P. 33 governs interrogatories to parties. See Wolfe, 147 Mont. at 40,
409 P.2d at 534 where the court stated, "Rule 37(a) sanctions may be imposed upon a party
who fails to comply with the discovery requirements of the rules, and specifically upon a
party who fails to properly answer interrogatories .... " (Emphasis added).
56. MONT. R. Civ. P. 33(a). For the text of Rule 33(a), see supra note 48.
57. See 4A J. MOORE & J. LUCAS, FEDERAL PRACTICE § 37.05, at 37-90 (Supp. 1977-78);
8 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 2026, at 579-81 (1970).
58. Id.
7
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penalties 59 on the resisting party.60 No court in Montana has con-
strued the language of Rule 33(a). Consequently, parties seeking
answers to interrogatories in Montana do not know whether Mon-
tana courts will follow the plain language of Rule 33(a) or the in-
terpretation given to it by leading authorities.
The third situation in which a party may move for an order
under Rule 37(a) occurs when a party served with a Rule 34 re-
quest for production of documents or entry upon land fails to re-
spond by indicating that inspection will be permitted or else fails
to permit inspection. A party may object to a Rule 34 request for
production of documents or entry upon land just as a party served
with interrogatories under Rule 33 may object to any interro-
gatory."1 Rule 34(b) authorizes the party submitting the request
for production of documents or entry upon land to move for an
order under Rule 37(a) when the other party objects to the re-
quested inspection, fails to respond to the request,62 or prohibits
the inspection as requested. 3
Rule 37(a) authorizes a party seeking discovery through depo-
sitions, interrogatories, or requests for production to move for an
order compelling discovery. Where a deponent or a party served
with interrogatories fails to answer a question on depositions" or
an interrogatory, 5 the discovering party may move for an order
compelling an answer.6 If a deponent corporation or other entity
fails to designate a person who can testify as to matters known or
59. The penalties which a discovering party may seek to impose for a complete failure
to respond to interrogatories are found in MONT. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2). These penalties include
orders (1) requiring that certain matters be taken as established in accordance with the
pleadings of the discovering party (MONT. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(A)); (2) prohibiting the disobe-
dient party from supporting or opposing designated claims or defenses or from introducing
designated matters into evidence (MONT. R. Civ. P. 37 (b)(2)(B)); or (3) striking pleadings,
dismissing the action, or rendering a default judgment against the disobedient party (MONT.
R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(C)). For a more thorough discussion of these penalties, see infra text
accompanying notes 88-140.
60. The rule provides that a discovering party "may move for an order under Rule
37(a) with respect to any objections to or failure to answer an interrogatory." MONT. R. Civ.
P. 33(a).
61. MONT. R. Civ. P. 34(b) allows a party to object to a Rule 34 request for production.
See supra note 55 and accompanying text discussing objections as an allowable response to
Rule 33 interrogatories.
62. See supra note 50.
63. The procedure outlined in MONT. R. Civ. P. 34(b) which authorizes a party seeking
inspection to move for an order under Rule 37(a) is very similar to the procedure outlined in
MONT. R. Civ. P. 33(a) which authorizes a party seeking answers to interrogatories to seek
such orders.
64. MONT. R. Civ. P. 30 and 31 govern the use of depositions.
65. MONT. R. Civ. P. 33 governs the use of interrogatories.
66. MONT. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(2).
8
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reasonably available to the corporation or entity,67 the party seek-
ing discovery may move for an order compelling a designation."' If
a party responds unsatisfactorily to a request for production or in-
spection, the party initiating the discovery may move for an order
compelling the inspection as requested."' If the court denies the
motion, in whole or in part, then it may issue an order under Rule
26(c) protecting the nonmoving party from further "annoyance,
embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense.
' 70
b. Rule 37(d)
Rule 37(d) authorizes the issuance of orders in addition to
those permitted under Rule 37(a). The discovery violations to
which Rule 37(d) orders apply, however, are much more serious
than those to which Rule 37(a) orders apply.7 ' As with Rule 37(a)
orders compelling discovery, Rule 37(d) orders may be granted in
three situations:72 (1) when a properly notified party fails to appear
67. Persons whom a corporation or entity can designate to testify include officers, di-
rectors, managing agents, or other persons who consent to testify on the corporation or en-
tity's behalf. MONT. R. Civ. P. 30(b)(6) and 31(a).
68. MONT. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(2).
69. Id.
70. MONT. R. Civ. P. 26(c) authorizes courts to grant protective orders which require:
(1) that the discovery not be had; (2) that the discovery may be had only on speci-
fied terms and conditions, including a designation of the time or place; (3) that
the discovery may be had only by a method of discovery other than that selected
by the party seeking discovery; (4) that certain matters not be inquired into, or
that the scope of the discovery be limited to certain matters; (5) that discovery be
conducted with no one present except persons designated by the court; (6) that a
deposition after being sealed be opened only by order of the court; (7) that a trade
secret or other confidential research, development, or commercial information not
be disclosed or be disclosed only in a designated way; (8) that the parties simulta-
neously file specified documents or information enclosed in sealed envelopes to be
opened as directed by the court.
If the motion for a protective order is denied in whole or in part, the court
may, on such terms and conditions as are just, order that any party or person
provide or permit discovery. The provisions of Rule 37(a)(4) apply to the award of
expenses incurred in relation to the motion.
(Emphasis added).
71. MONT. R. Civ. P. 37(d) authorizes default judgments and dismissals both of which
are more severe than the motions to compel authorized by Rule 37(a). See Calaway, -
Mont. at -, 624 P.2d at 992 (the court dismissed the action but noted that "[entering a
default judgment or dismissal with prejudice is a drastic sanction to impose . . . for failing
to attend a pretrial conference." The court noted further that severe sanctions are appropri-
ate only where the errant party displays "continual delay, abuse and disregard of the court's
authority ....1").
72. The three orders of Rule 37(d) are discussed infra text accompanying notes 73-87.
In addition to the three orders mentioned already, a court may order a disobedient party to
pay reasonable expenses pursuant to Rule 37(d). For a discussion of Rule 37(d) monetary
sanctions see infra notes 167-71 and accompanying text.
9
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at a deposition;7 (2) when a party fails to answer or object to
properly served interrogatories submitted under Rule 33(a);7 " and
(3) when a properly served party fails to serve a written response
to a Rule 34 request for production or inspection. 5
To obtain an order under Rule 37(d), the party seeking discov-
ery must make a motion for the order in the court in which the
action is pending. 76 The court may then issue such orders "as are
just. 17 7 The language of Rule 37(d) provides for only three types of
orders, all relatively severe in comparison to the orders of Rule
37(a).78
The three types of orders expressly authorized under Rule
37(d) are set forth in Rule 37(b)(2). Rule 37(d) orders typically ap-
ply only to cases where a party flagrantly abuses discovery
processes.7 e First, the court may order various matters or facts es-
tablished in accordance to the claim obtaining the order.80 Sec-
ondly, a court may issue an order forbidding the disobedient party
to support or oppose designated claims or defenses or to introduce
designated matters into evidence. 8 Thirdly, an order may be is-
sued which strikes pleadings in whole or in part, stays further pro-
ceedings until the order is obeyed, dismisses the action in whole or
in part, or renders a default judgment against the recalcitrant
party.82 The orders enumerated within Rule 37(d) do not comprise
an all-inclusive list, and the courts have interpreted Rule 37(d) as
allowing less severe sanctions.8 s
Today, Rule 37(d) provides a wider range of sanctions than it
73. MONT. R. Civ. P. 37(d) provides that "a party or an officer, director, or managing
agent of a party or a person designated under Rule 30(b)(6) or 31(a) to testify on behalf of a
party" may be ordered, on motion to discover, to pay reasonable expenses caused by the
failure to discover or to both discover and pay expenses.
74. MONT. R. Civ. P. 37(d).
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. See also supra note 35.
78. MONT. R. Civ. P. 37(d) provides in part: "the court... may make such orders...
as are just, and among others it may take any action authorized under paragraphs (A), (B),
and (C) of subdivision (b)(2) of this rule . For the text of MONT. R. CIv. P. 37(b)(2)(A),
(B) and (C), see infra note 88.
79. See MOORE'S PAMPHLET, supra note 49, 37.05 (1984).
80. Such an order is authorized under both MONT. R. Civ. P. 37(b) and 37(d) but is set
forth only in MONT. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(A).
81. A court may impose the sanctions found in MONT. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(B) under
either MONT. Civ. P. 37(b) or 37(d). These orders are found in MONT. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(B).
82. The orders provided in MONT. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(C) are allowed under both MONT.
R. Civ. P. 37(b) and 37(d).
83. E.g., Gill v. Stolow, 240 F.2d 669 (2d Cir. 1957); Saltzman v. Birrell, 156 F. Supp.
538 (S.D.N.Y. 1957); 2A W. BARRON & A. HOLTZOFF, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 554-
57 (Wright ed. 1961).
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did when it was first enacted. The establishment of "willful fail-
ure" to respond or to appear, once a prerequisite to obtaining an
order under Rule 37(d), is no longer required, although "willful-
ness" is still a primary consideration in determining which orders
to issue. Accordingly, in Societe Internationale v. Rogers,8 where
plaintiff failed to fully comply with a pretrial production order, the
willfulness or good faith of a party against whom discovery was
sought was deemed relevant but only to the determination by the
court as to what course it should follow if a party failed to comply
with discovery. 5 Rule 37, as a whole, and Rule 37(d), in particular,
are construed as allowing courts flexibility in fashioning orders ap-
propriate to each case. 6
Because the sanctions of Rule 37(d) are more severe than
those permitted under Rule 37(a),8 7 they are legitimately applied
only in cases of grievous misconduct. No Montana court which has
ordered one of these sanctions has cited Rule 37(d) as authority.
Instead, courts support the decision to impose severe sanctions by
citing Rule 37(b).
2. Penalties for Failure to Comply with Court Orders Compel-
ling Discovery-Rule 37(b)(2)
Rule 37(b)(2) lists the penalties which a court may impose for
the failure to comply with any "order to provide or permit discov-
ery" 88 and includes orders issued under Rules 37(a) 89 and 35.9o The
84. 357 U.S. 197 (1958). The holding of Societe Internationale is stated in supra note
35.
85. 357 U.S. at 208. The decision in Societe Internationale was based on Rule 37(b),
not on Rule 37(d), but the court's comments regarding "willfulness" apply to all of the
subsections of Rule 37.
86. See id.
87. Rule 37(a) orders merely direct the disobedient party to respond to various meth-
ods of discovery whereas Rule 37(d) orders effectively disadvantage the disobedient party's
case.
88. The orders which a court may issue under MONT. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2) include:
(A) An order that the matters regarding which the order was made or any
other designated facts shall be taken to be established for the purposes of the
action in accordance with the claim of the party obtaining the order;
(B) An order refusing to allow the disobedient party to support or oppose
designated claims or defenses, or prohibiting him from introducing designated
matters in evidence;
(C) An order striking out pleadings or parts thereof, or staying further pro-
ceedings until the order is obeyed, or dismissing the action or proceeding or any
part thereof, or rendering a judgment by default against the disobedient party;
(D) In lieu of any of the foregoing orders or in addition thereto, an order
treating as a contempt of court the failure to obey any orders except an order to
submit to a physical or mental examination;
(E) Where a party has failed to comply with an order under Rule 35(a) re-
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penalties of Rule 37(b)(2) apply to parties; to officers, directors, or
managing agents of a party; or to other persons who consent to
testify on behalf of a party.91 Rule 37(b)(2) penalties are imposed
without motion by the discovering party unlike other penalties92
which require parties seeking to enforce discovery to move for an
order in the appropriate court.
This is not to say that the party in whose favor the sanction is
granted does not file a motion at any time before the imposition of
a sanction under Rule 37(b)(2). The sanctions of Rule 37(b)(2) are
generally imposed for failure to comply with a court order compel-
ling discovery.93 To obtain a court order compelling discovery, a
party must first move the court."' Consequently, a person who ob-
tains relief under Rule 37(b)(2) does file a motion earlier in the
discovery process. If the party against whom discovery is sought
fails to comply with the court order compelling discovery, the court
in which the action is pending simply issues whatever sanctions are
"just"96 without any motion by the discovering party.
quiring him to produce another for examination, such orders as are listed in
paragraphs (A), (B), and (C) of this subdivision, unless the party failing to comply
shows that he is unable to produce such person for examination.
In lieu of any of the foregoing orders or in addition thereto, the court shall
require the party failing to obey the order or the attorney adivising him or both to
pay the reasonable expenses, including attorney's fees caused by the failure, unless
the court finds that the failure was substantially justified or that other circum-
stances make an award of expenses unjust.
Only MONT. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(A), (B) and (C) are discussed in this section concerning
penalties for failure to comply with court orders compelling discovery. MONT. R. Civ. P.
37(b)(2)(D), dealing with contempt orders, is discussed infra text accompanying note 141.
The last paragraph of MONT. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2), dealing with monetary sanctions, is dis-
cussed infra text accompanying notes 157-60.
89. For a discussion of the orders which may be issued under MONT. R. Civ. P. 37(a),
see supra text accompanying notes 46-70.
90. Under MONT. R. Civ. P. 35(a), Montana courts are authorized to issue orders re-
quiring the mental or physical examination of a person only when the mental or physical
condition of a party or other person is in controversy and only on motion for good cause
shown and upon notice to the person to be examined and all parties of the time, place,
manner, and scope of the examination. Under MONT. R. Civ. P. 35(b), a court may, on mo-
tion, order a party to deliver a copy of a detailed written report of the examining physician
to the party or examined person who requests such a report when the terms of the request
are just.
91. For an explanation of MONT. R. Civ. P. 30(b)(6) and 31(a), see supra note 53.
92. To obtain orders under MONT. R. Civ. P. 37(a) or MONT. R. Civ. P. 37(d), the party
seeking to enforce discovery must move for the order in the appropriate court.
93. See supra text accompanying notes 46-70 for the instances in which Rule 37(a)
court orders compelling discovery are granted.
94. For example, a party must first move the court to obtain orders compelling discov-
ery under MONT. R. Civ. P. 26(c), 33(a), 34(b), 35(b)(1), 37(a), and 37(d).
95. MONT. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2) provides in relevant part that "the court in which the
action is pending may make such orders in regard to the failure as are just" without any
motion by the discovering party.
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Courts have imposed the sanctions of Rule 37(b)(2) in a num-
ber of cases. The United States Supreme Court first reviewed the
imposition of Rule 37(b)(2) sanctions in Societe Internationale v.
Rogers.98 In Societe Internationale, the district court dismissed a
complaint under Rule 37(b)(2) because the plaintiff failed to com-
ply with a production order. The court of appeals affirmed, basing
its power to dismiss the complaint on Rule 41(b).9 7 The Supreme
Court, however, held that dismissal of the complaint without
prejudice was not justified and reversed the lower court's decision.
In support of its decision, the Court noted that "Rule 37 should
not be construed to authorize dismissal of [the] complaint because
of petitioner's noncompliance with a pretrial production order
when it [had] been established that failure to comply . .. [was]
due to inability, and not to willfulness, bad faith, or any fault of
petitioner." 98
Eighteen years later, in National Hockey League v. Metropol-
itan Hockey Club,99 the Court again considered the imposition of a
Rule 37(b)(2) sanction. This time, the Court found that the district
court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing respondents' case
pursuant to Rule 37(b)(2).1 1° The district court had ample support
for its decision given respondents' failure to answer written inter-
rogatories as ordered by the court. Although the Court mentioned
Societe Internationale and its standards of "willfulness" and "bad
faith," it upheld the lower court's decision to dismiss, an extreme
sanction, on the grounds that respondents and their counsel had
exercised "flagrant bad faith" and "callous disregard" of their
responsibilities.'
The Montana Supreme Court first reviewed the imposition of
a Rule 37(b)(2) sanction in Audit Services, Inc. v. Kraus Construc-
tion, Inc.10' In Audit Services, a case concerning the collection of
delinquent contributions owed to a union trust fund, the district
court entered a default judgment against the defendant who dis-
obeyed a court order compelling him to answer interrogatories. ' 01
96. 357 U.S. 197 (1958).
97. MONT. R. Civ. P. 41(b) deals with involuntary dismissals and provides in part: "For
failure of the plaintiff to prosecute or to comply with these rules or any order of court, a
defendant may move for dismissal of an action or of any claim against him."
98. Societe Internationale, 357 U.S. at 212.
99. 427 U.S. 639 (1976).
100. Id. at 643. MONT. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(C) authorizes the court to dismiss a case for
failure to comply with a discovery order. See supra note 88 for the text of Rule 37(b)(2)(C).
101. National Hockey League, 427 U.S. at 643.
102. - Mont. - , 615 P.2d 183 (1980).
103. MONT. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(C) provides that a court may enter a default judgment
when a party fails to comply with an order compelling discovery. The text of Rule
1985]
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It should be noted that although the sanction imposed-a default
judgment-is set forth in Rule 37(b)(2)(C), Audit Services was ac-
tually decided under Rule 37(d) which refers to Rule 37(b)(2)(C) in
permitting the entry of a default judgment for the failure to attend
a deposition, answer interrogatories, or respond to a request for
documents or inspection.' Nevertheless, in Audit Services, the
court adopted a policy of implementing severe sanctions for serious
abuses of the discovery rules.
The following year, in Calaway v. Jones,0 5 the court adhered
to the strict policy concerning discovery abuses developed in Audit
Services. Calaway sued for damages incurred for the loss of a po-
tato crop allegedly caused by Jones' failure to provide an irrigation
system. The court, as in Audit Services, affirmed a default judg-
ment'06 entered by the district court because the defendant, Jones,
failed to attend a pretrial conference. 07 Jones had also failed to
respond to interrogatories within the statutory time limit, 0 8 failed
to appear at depositions, and failed to seek substitute counsel for
more than eight months after his first counsel withdrew. The court
found that Jones' conduct represented an "attitude of unrespon-
siveness' ' 109 and that the district court acted "within the permissi-
ble range of discretion in imposing the sanction of default and
dismissal."" o
The Montana Supreme Court reaffirmed the policy set forth in
Audit Services and Calaway, to impose sanctions for discovery
abuses, in the landmark products liability case of Owen v. F.A.
Buttrey Co."' In Owen, defendant Charles Revson, Inc. repeatedly
37(b)(2)(C) is printed at supra note 88.
In affirming the district court's decision, the court contrasted the general judicial disfa-
vor of "first appearance" default judgments, Audit Services, __ Mont. at __, 615 P.2d
at 187 (citing Kootenai Corp. v. Dayton, - Mont. __, 601 P.2d 47 (1979)); Little Horn
State Bank v. Real Bird, 183 Mont. 208, 598 P.2d 1109 (1979); Shields v. Prikle Refrigerated
Freightlines, Inc., - Mont..., 591 P.2d 1120 (1979), to the judicial acceptance of de-
fault judgments entered on non-compliance with the discovery rules. __ Mont. at -,
615 P.2d at 187.
104. See supra notes 80-82 and accompanying text for a discussion of the orders au-
thorized under Rule 37(d) and Rule 37(b)(2), but set forth only in Rule 37(b)(2).
105. - Mont. -, 624 P.2d 991 (1981).
106. See supra note 103.
107. Calaway, - Mont. at - , 624 P.2d at 992. Defendant had received notice as
to the time and place of the pretrial conference.
108. MONT. R. Civ. P. 33(a) requires a response within 30 days after service of the
interrogatories except that a defendant may respond within 45 days after service of the
summons and complaint.
109. Calaway, - Mont. at -, 624 P.2d at 992.
110. Id.
111. - Mont. - , 627 P.2d 1233 (1981). For a previous discussion of Owen, see
supra notes 29-34 and accompanying text.
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failed to comply with court orders compelling answers to written
interrogatories and consequently caused an earlier trial date to be
continued. Because of Revson's disobedience, the trial court struck
certain paragraphs of its answer 12 and thereby precluded it from
introducing evidence contrary to the admitted facts. In addition,
the court ordered Revson to pay plaintiff's counsel reasonable at-
torney fees. 3 The court in Owen actually based its decision on
Rule 37(d), 4 but its authority to strike parts of defendant's an-
swers, while permitted under both Rule 37(b) and Rule 37(d), is
set forth in Rule 37(b)(2)(C). The order by the court requiring de-
fendant to pay plaintiff's attorney fees is likewise permitted under
both Rule 37(b)(2)(E) and Rule 37(d). The Owen decision, none-
theless, represents the intention of the court to use Rule 37 sanc-
tions for punishment and deterrence. 18
In In re Marriage of Hill,"' a divorce proceeding which cites
Owen, the court allowed the opponent of a disobedient party addi-
tional time to pursue an examination of a disputed piece of prop-
erty. The disobedient party in Hill had failed to comply with a
court order shortening the time to respond to interrogatories.1 1 7
The court refused to condone any failure to comply with district
court orders or any other frustration of discovery and punished the
recalcitrant party for frustrating the discovery process by allowing
the discovering party additional time to examine the disputed
property."'
Beginning with Audit Services and ending with Hill, the Mon-
tana Supreme Court has maintained an attitude of intolerance to-
ward litigants who frustrate or delay discovery. In Johnson v.
Young Men's Christian Association,' 9 however, the court de-
parted from its strict position. The plaintiff, in Johnson, claiming
negligence for a learning disability his son allegedly suffered after
being found submerged in the YMCA pool, moved for a new trial
112. Under MONT. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(C), a court may strike pleadings.
113. Under MONT. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(E), the court may order a disobedient party to
pay reasonable expenses, including attorney fees, caused by the party's failure to comply
with a court order compelling discovery. The imposition of Rule 37(b)(2) monetary sanc-
tions is discussed more fully infra text accompanying notes 157-60.
114. The court in Vehrs v. Piquette, - Mont. -, 684 P.2d 476 (1984), stated that
Rule 37(d), not 37(b), was the basis of its decision in Owen. Id. at -, 684 P.2d at 480.
Also, the court in Owen never mentioned Rule 37(b)(2) but cited to and included the body
of Rule 37(d). - Mont. at __, 627 P.2d at 1234-35.
115. For previous discussion of Owen, see supra text accompanying notes 29-34.
116. - Mont. -, 643 P.2d 582 (1982).
117. Id. at - , 643 P.2d at 587.
118. Id. (citing Owen, __ Mont. - , 627 P.2d 1233).
119. - Mont. . 651 P.2d 1245 (1982).
1985]
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partly because the defendant, YMCA, failed to supplement its in-
terrogatory answers. 2 0 The court affirmed the lower court's refusal
to impose sanctions on either party. In arriving at its decision, the
court noted that neither counsel displayed actions that were "com-
mendable as both were lax in keeping the other party informed of
pretrial developments and in supplementing answers to interroga-
tories."12 ' YMCA's failure to supplement interrogatories was not
held sufficiently abusive, in light of Johnson's own failure to sup-
plement interrogatories, to warrant the imposition of sanctions per
Rule 37(b). Johnson does not, however, represent a total departure
from Owen, since it cited Owen to support its statement that pro-
tecting the integrity of discovery under the rules opens up the
facts, encourages settlements, and avoids protracted litigation. 2
In the recent negligence case of Thibaudeau v. Uglum,12' a
suit for medical costs, pain and suffering, and loss of earnings re-
sulting from a car accident, the Montana Supreme Court departed
further from its strict stance regarding discovery abuses. The de-
fendant in Thibaudeau failed to accurately answer interrogatories
and attempted to impeach the plaintiff by using the omitted infor-
mation. Noting that reversal and a new trial may be obtained
where interrogatories are not properly answered,2 4 the court none-
theless refused the plaintiff's request for reasonable damages alleg-
edly caused by the defendant's failure to comply with discovery
rules.1 25 The primary reason for denying the plaintiff's request was
that Rule 37(b) relates to a failure to comply with court orders,
and the plaintiff had obtained no court order against the defen-
dant.12 Technically, the court correctly refused to impose sanc-
tions against the defendant under Rule 37(b), since Rule 37(b)
governs only failures to comply with orders, and here plaintiff had
obtained no order.
The most recent case dealing with Rule 37 sanctions, Vehrs v.
Piquette,'27 reiterated the holding of Owen that severe district
court sanctions should be imposed where parties fail to comply
with orders compelling discovery. In Vehrs, the plaintiff brought a
120. Plaintiff claimed that defendant was allowed to add four new witnesses the day
before trial, including one the whereabouts of whom defendant knew but did not inform
plaintiff.
121. Johnson, - Mont. at -, 651 P.2d at 1249.
122. Id. at -, 651 P.2d at 1254.
123. Mont. -, 653 P.2d 855 (1982).
124. Id. at - , 653 P.2d at 858 (citing Sanders v. Mt. Haggin Livestock Co., 160
Mont. 73, 500 P.2d 397 (1972)).
125. The plaintiff, Thibaudeau, made his request pursuant to MONT. R. Civ. P. 37(b).
126. Thibaudeau, - Mont. at __, 653 P.2d at 858.
127. - Mont.... 684 P.2d 476 (1984).
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malicious prosecution action. The district court granted the defen-
dants' motion for an order limiting the plaintiff's proof to evidence
contained in discovery documents and documents readily accessi-
ble to both parties 128 because the plaintiff filed late answers to in-
terrogatories, gave unverified answers, and served incomplete re-
sponses. Citing Owen and Rule 37(d), the court held that the
district court acted "well within the confines of its discretion when
it imposed the discovery sanctions at issue. '  The court noted
that the abuses of this case were less severe than those presented
in Owen and National Hockey League, and concluded that the
sanction imposed should likewise be less severe.' Accordingly, the
court found the district court's sanction to be "well-tailored to the
discovery abuse present."' ' The court further found that limiting
the facts to those disclosed in discovery was equitable since it re-
sulted from the actions of the plaintiff and his attorney. 3 2
The Montana Supreme Court has developed a policy, through
case law, to impose the sanctions of Rule 37(b)(2) against parties
displaying "flagrant bad faith,'1 33 "callous disregard" of their re-
sponsibilities, 134 or "an attitude of unresponsiveness. 1 35 In such
instances, the court is likely to uphold the imposition of "well-tai-
lored,'"'3 "equitable"' 3 7 sanctions. The court has approved Rule 37
orders (1) which require that designated facts or matters be estab-
lished in favor of the party obtaining the order; 38 (2) that forbid'a
disobedient party from supporting or opposing designated claims
or defenses or prohibit the party from introducing designated mat-
ters into evidence;3 9 and (3) that strike pleadings in whole or in
part, stay further proceedings until the order is obeyed, dismiss an
128. MONT. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2) allows the limitation of evidence to the detriment of the
disobedient party.
129. Vehrs, - Mont. at __, 684 P.2d at 480.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. National Hockey League, 427 U.S. at 643.
134. Id.
135. Calaway, - Mont. at __, 624 P.2d at 992.
136. Vehrs, - Mont. at __, 684 P.2d at 480.
137. Id.
138. These types of sanctions are permitted under MONT. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(A). See
Stanton, 88 F.R.D. 290 (holding in part that plaintiff was entitled to have certain facts
material to his action taken as established).
139. These types of orders are authorized by MONT. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(B). See Vehrs,
- Mont. -, 684 P.2d 476 (holding in part that the district court acted within its dis-
cretion in limiting plaintiffs proof on certain counts to evidence contained in discovery doc-
uments and documents readily accessible to both parties); Owen, - Mont. __, 627 P.2d
1233 (holding in part that the district court was justified in precluding the disobedient de-
fendant from introducing evidence contrary to the admitted facts).
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action in whole or in part, or render a judgment by default against
the disobedient party.14
0
3. Contempt Citations-Rules 37(b)(1) and 37(b)(2)(D)
a. Rule 37(b)(1)
Under Rule 37(b)(1), the district court authorizing a deposi-
tion may consider as contempt the failure of a deponent to be
sworn or to answer a question. A deponent cannot be held in con-
tempt until (1) the court issues a direction or order requiring the
deponent to be sworn or to answer a question and (2) the deponent
then disobeys the order or direction of the court. Rule 37(b)(1)
permits district courts authorizing depositions to issue contempt
citations when deponents disobey court orders compelling answers
to deposition questions.
b. Rule 37(b) (2) (D)
Rule 37(b)(1) is only one part of Rule 37 which authorizes a
district court to treat a party's failure to comply with discovery as
contempt. Rule 37(b)(2)(D) also authorizes the district court in
which an action is pending to issue a contempt citation against any
party who fails to obey orders of the court, except orders to submit
to physical or mental examinations."" Rule 37(b)(2) is broader in
scope than Rule 37(b)(1) and allows district courts to issue con-
tempt citations for failure to discover beyond the mere failure to
answer a question in a deposition.
4. Monetary Sanctions-Rules 37(a)(4), 37(b)(2), 37(c) and
37(d)
A district court in which an action is pending can impose not
140. These orders are governed by MONT. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(C). See Owen, - Mont.
- 627 P.2d 1233 (holding in part that the district court was justified in striking part of
the defendant's answer for its reluctance to facilitate discovery and its failure to justify its
dilatory actions); Calaway, - Mont. - , 624 P.2d 991 (holding that the district court
was within its discretion to impose the sanctions of default and dismissal for defendant's
failure to attend a pretrial conference); Audit Services, - Mont. ., 615 P.2d 183
(holding in part that the trial court acted within its discretion in refusing to set aside a
default judgment where defendants failed to answer interrogatories for seven months). The
Montana Supreme Court will impose the sanctions of Rule 37(b)(2) where the facts of a case
warrant a severe penalty.
141. MONT. R. Civ. P. 35(a) authorizes "the court in which [an] action is pending [to]
order [a] party to submit to a physical or mental examination by a physician or to produce
for examination the person in his custody or legal control." See supra note 90 for a more
detailed discussion of Rule 35(a).
[Vol. 46
18
Montana Law Review, Vol. 46 [1985], Iss. 1, Art. 6
https://scholarship.law.umt.edu/mlr/vol46/iss1/6
RULE 37 SANCTIONS
only orders compelling discovery, penalties for failing to comply
with court orders, and contempt citations, but also monetary sanc-
tions. Rule 37 provides four categories of monetary sanctions.
a. Rule 37(a)(4)
The first category applies to motions to compel discovery
under Rule 37(a)(2) and is set forth in Rule 37(a)(4). Under this
variety of monetary sanctions, the party losing a Rule 37(a)(2) mo-
tion to compel discovery must pay the reasonable expenses in-
curred in obtaining the order, including attorney fees.14 ' The party
who necessitates the motion is not the only one who may be re-
quired to pay the reasonable costs of obtaining the order; the at-
torney advising the party's conduct also may be ordered to pay the
costs.1 43 In some cases, a court may order both the party and the
attorney to pay such costs. 14 In the event that a Rule 37(a)(4) mo-
tion to compel discovery is granted in part and denied in part,
whereby neither party wins, the court may apportion, in a just
manner, the reasonable expenses incurred by the parties in raising
and opposing the motion." 5
Rule 37(a)(4) requires the court to award expenses "unless the
court finds that the opposition to the motion was substantially jus-
tified or that the circumstances make an award of expenses un-
just."' 6 The party who loses a case posing a real dispute about
discovery is substantially justified in pursuing the matter in
court."17 The purpose of Rule 37(a)(4) and its authorization of
monetary sanctions is to discourage parties and their attorneys
from pursuing frivolous requests for or objections to discovery in
court.",
8
In 1981, the Montana Supreme Court decided two cases in
which it stated its position regarding the monetary sanctions of
Rule 37(a)(4). First, in Jaap v. District Court,"9 the court noted
that under Rule 37(a)(4) district courts may require persons who
142. MONT. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(4).
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id. Prior to the 1970 amendment to Rule 37(a)(4), expenses were to be awarded
only if the court determined that the losing party acted without substantial justification.
After the 1970 amendment to Rule 37(a)(4), however, expenses were to be awarded unless
the court found that the losing party acted without substantial justification. The purpose for
the amendment to Rule 37(a)(4) was "to encourage judges to be more alert to abuses occur-
ring in the discovery process." MOORE'S PAMPHLET, supra note 49, 37.02(8).
147. See MOORE'S PAMPHLET, supra note 49, 37.02(8).
148. Id.
149. __ Mont. - , 623 P.2d 1389 (1981).
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necessitate and then lose a discovery dispute to pay all reasonable
expenses, including attorney fees, incurred in supporting or oppos-
ing the dispute. 50 The court noted further that an examining
party and his attorney should respect objections of privilege having
substantial justification and that a deponent and his attorney
should not interpose insubstantial or unjustifiable objections of
privilege."' Although the holding of the court in Jaap did not di-
rectly involve Rule 37(a)(4),' 52 the Montana Supeme Court clearly
stated that its monetary sanctions are available to district courts in
allowing and enforcing the methods of discovery provided in Rule
26(a). 153
In the second case involving monetary sanctions, State ex rel.
Guarantee Insurance v. District Court,' the Montana Supreme
Court declined jurisdiction of the cause and dismissed the relator's
petition for a writ of supervisory control. The relator, Guarantee
Insurance Co., had contended that it would incur "great hardship
and expense" if forced to answer two interrogatories as ordered by
the district court.' 55 The court rejected Guarantee Insurance Co.'s
contention, noting, (1) that little hardship would be involved since
the interrogatories could be answered easily by retrieving the nec-
essary claims records from a computer, and (2) that the expense
involved could be assessed against the losing party at trial or upon
appeal pursuant to Rule 37(a)(4).' 56
b. Rule 37(b)(2)
The second category of monetary sanctions is found in Rule
37(b)(2). This type of monetary sanction covers a broader scope of
activities than does Rule 37(a)(4). 15 7 Like Rule 37(a)(4), however,
Rule 37(b)(2) permits awards of reasonable expenses, including at-
torney fees, incurred by the prevailing party in supporting or op-
posing a motion to compel discovery. 58 The sanctions provided in
Rule 37(b)(2) are available against parties who exhibit an overall
150. Id. at __, 623 P.2d at 1392.
151. Id. See also 4 J. MOORE, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 26.60(5), at 26-216 (1984).
152. The court held that the district court was without power to order the private
interview of plaintiffs physicians by defendant. In allowing and enforcing discovery, the
district court should have used one of the discovery methods provided in Rule 2 6(a). Since
private interviews are not included in the methods of Rule 26(a), the sanctions and protec-
tions of Rule 37 are not available to them. Jaap, - Mont. at __, 623 P.2d at 1392.
153. Jaap, - Mont. at __, 623 P.2d at 1392.
154. - Mont. -, 634 P.2d 648 (1981).
155. Id. at - , 634 P.2d at 651.
156. Id.
157. MCCULLOUGH & UNDERWOOD, supra note 41, at 308.
158. MONT. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2), last paragraph.
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failure to comply with the discovery process, including the failure
to obey other types of discovery orders. 59 A court may impose the
monetary sanctions of Rule 37(b)(2) in lieu of, or in addition to,
the other sanctions provided in Rule 37(b)(2).' 60 Like Rule
37(a)(4), Rule 37(b)(2) places the burden on the disobedient party
to avoid expenses by establishing that his failure is substantially
justified or that certain circumstances make an award of expenses
unjust.
c. Rule 37(c)
A third category of monetary sanctions is authorized under
Rule 37(c). These monetary sanctions apply where a party fails to
admit the genuineness of any document or the truth of any matter
as requested under Rule 36, and the party requesting the admis-
sion later proves that the document is genuine or the matter is
true."' Rule 36 provides the means by which a party may obtain
an admission, a sworn and specific denial, or a sworn statement
"setting forth in detail the reasons why he cannot truthfully admit
or deny.' 6 2 The broad scope of Rule 37(c) covers all failures to
conform with Rule 36.163 If a party improperly refuses a request for
admission, then the court must require that the disobedient party
pay expenses incurred by the other side in presenting the neces-
sary proof at trial "unless it finds that (1) the request was held
objectionable pursuant to Rule 36(a), or (2) the admission sought
was of no substantial importance, or (3) the party failing to admit
had reasonable ground to believe that he might prevail on the mat-
ter, or (4) there was other good reason for the failure to admit.'16
Montana courts do not award monetary sanctions in every
case, and in Luppold v. Lewis'6 5 the court did not award expenses.
159. McCULLOUGH & UNDERWOOD, supra note 41, at 308.
160. For a list of the sanctions provided in Rule 37(b)(2), see supra note 88.
161. MONT. R. Civ. P. 36(a) provides in relevant part:
A party may serve upon any other party a written request for the admission,
for purposes of the pending action, only, of the truth of any matters within the
scope of Rule 26(b) set forth in the request that relate to statements or opinions
of fact or of the application of law to fact, including the genuineness of any docu-
ments described in the request.
. . . The matter is admitted unless, within 30 days after service of the re-
quest, or within such shorter or longer time as the court may allow, the party to
whom the request is directed serves upon the party requesting the admission a
written answer or objection addressed to the matter, signed by the party or by his
attorney. . ..
162. MOORE'S PAMPHLET, supra note 49 37.02(2).
163. Id.
164. MONT. R. Civ. P. 37(c).
165. - Mont. -, 563 P.2d 538 (1977).
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Respondents, Luppold et al., had included their motion for attor-
ney fees, incurred in providing proof of facts set forth in a request
for admission, in a proposed findings of facts and conclusions of
law. Lewis received notice of the motion when the district court
awarded attorney fees in its findings of fact and conclusions of law.
The Montana Supreme Court reversed the award of attorney fees
on the grounds that notice of the motion was "insufficient to allow
a resisting party 'the opportunity to be present and intelligently to
oppose the motion when made.' "166
d. Rule 37(d)
The final category of available monetary sanctions is found in
Rule 37(d). These sanctions may be imposed against parties who
fail to attend a deposition, fail to serve answers to interrogatories,
or fail to respond to requests for inspection.' A court may impose
the monetary sanctions of Rule 37(d) in lieu of, or in addition to,
the other available orders.' The court may order the party re-
sisting discovery or his attorney to pay to the other party all rea-
sonable expenses, including attorney fees, caused by the resis-
tance.'69 To avoid these expenses, the disobedient party must show
that his resistance was substantially justified or that other circum-
stances make an award of expenses unjust.17 0 A court may not ex-
cuse a party's resistance to discovery on the ground that the dis-
covery sought is objectionable unless the party resisting discovery
has applied for a protective order under Rule 26(c).' 7 '
IV. CONCLUSION
The Montana Supreme Court has shown a willingness to im-
pose Rule 37 sanctions as a means of encouraging compliance with
and punishing disobedience of discovery orders and requests. 7 At
the same time, recent decisions by the court indicate that only se-
vere discovery abuses warrant the imposition of Rule 37 sanc-
tions. 73 The decision to impose Rule 37 sanctions ultimately de-
166. Id. at __, 563 P.2d at 546.
167. MONT. R. Civ. P. 37(d).
168. For a discussion of the sanctions available under Rule 37(d), see supra notes 71-
87 and accompanying text.
169. MONT. R. Civ. P. 37(d).
170. Id.
171. Id. See supra note 70 for a list of the protective orders authorized by Rule 26(c).
172. See, e.g., Vehrs, __ Mont. __, 684 P.2d 476; In re Marriage of Hill, -
Mont. __, 643 P.2d 582; Owen, - Mont. -, 627 P.2d 1233; Audit Services, __
Mont. , 615 P.2d 183.
173. See, e.g., Thibaudeau, - Mont.__, 653 P.2d 855; Johnson, - Mont. __,
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pends on the nature of the discovery abuse or abuses involved in a
particular case. Where the existing discovery abuses delay discov-
ery enough to warrant punishment, however, Montana district
courts will cautiously impose court orders compelling discovery,
174
penalties for failure to comply with court orders compelling discov-
ery,' 75 contempt citations,'17 and monetary sanctions. 177 Abuses of
the discovery process, although once ignored, will no longer be tol-
erated in Montana.
651 P.2d 1245.
174. MONT. R. CIv. P. 37(a), 37(d).
175. MONT. R. CIV. P. 37(b)(2).
.176. MONT. R. Civ. P.37(b)(1), 37(b)(2)(D).
177. MONT. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(4), 37(b)(2), 37(c), 37(d).
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